I. INTRODUCTION
Some scientists believe that exemplars, or individual experiences, can be learned and remembered, like those of familiar faces. Unfortunately, storing every exemplar can lead to a combinatorial explosion of memory, as well as to unwieldy memory retrieval. Others believe that we learn prototypes that represent more general properties of the environment, such as that everyone has a face. But then how do we learn specific episodic memories? Popular cognitive models of these processes also do not describe how this information is learned. This article briefly summarizes recent results showing that a variant of distributed Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) can incrementally learn categories in a way that allows quantitative fits of human categorization data, while clarifying how both specific and general information can be incrementally learned in a context-appropriate way. The model also sheds light on amnesic categorization data.
More generally, these results support the hypothesis that brain processes underlying categorization are part of a larger system whereby the brain is designed to learn about a changing world. In particular, the processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of bottom-up adaptive filters that activate recognition categories, the read-out of top-down expectations by these categories, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes lllustrative psychophysical and neurobiological data have been explained and quantitatively simulated using these concepts in the areas of early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, and speech perception, among others [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . These articles summarize recent neurobiological experiments that provide convergent evidence for ART predictions, including the predicted link between learned expectations, attention, resonant synchronization, and learning, with top-down expectations computed by modulatory on-center off-surround networks that can prime the brain to get ready for bottom-up information that may or may not occur, and match or mismatch such information when it does occur, focusing attention upon patterns of critical features that match the modulatory on-center, thereby leading to synchronization and gain amplification of these features, while suppressing mismatched features.
II. UNIFYING EXEMPLARS AND PROTOTYPES USING ATTENTIONALLY MODULATED CRITICAL FEATURE

PArTERNS
In the cognitive literature on recognition, and more specifically on object categorization, prototype and exemplar descriptions have lead to prominent models of the human categorization process. In the prototype-based approaches [6] [7] [8] [9] , a single center of a category is extracted from many exemplars, to-be-categorized items are compared to these category prototypes, and they are assigned to the category of the most similar prototype. The alternative exemplar-based approach [10] [11] [12] [13] Despite the significant progress represented by these three modeling approaches, they all experience several shortcomings. A key difficulty is that all the models take the form of formal equations for response probabilities. None of them actually learns their exemplars or prototypes. using the type of real-time incremental learning process that humans typically experience during a new categorization task. Prototype models define prototypes a priori even though these prototypes might not be the ones that are actually used by human subjects. None of these models explains how exemplar or prototype information may be stored or retrieved in real time as part of the brain's information processing dynamics. In particular, the successful exemplar models all use combinations of exemplars, not individual exemplars, to derive formal response probabilities, but the real-time process whereby these combinations are derived from stored individual exemplars is not specified. Finally, none of these models sheds light upon the types of brain categorization processes for which neurophysiological data have been accumulated in cortical areas like inferotemporal cortex, or IT, from awake behaving monkeys as they learn and perform categorization tasks [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] (Table 1) . Starting in the early 1980's, exemplar-based models gave consistently better fits to experimental data than prototype-based models. Smith and Minda [8] have shown, however, using thirty data sets of this category structure, that when allowed greater flexibility, prototype models produce results that overcome some of the earlier problems, but this claim has been challenged [27, 28] . [12, 13, 16, 17, 29] it is assumed that class prototypes are the two extreme points of the sample An index of within-category coherence and betweencategory differentiation, used by Smith and Minda [8] , is the structural ratio. It is defined as the ratio of withincategory similarity to between-category similarity. The two similarity measures for this category structure are 2.4 and 1.6, respectively. The structural ratio is thus 1.5, which is quite low; a structural ratio of 1.0 implies no differentiation, and a structural ratio greater than 3.0 implies easy differentiation. 8 10 Item Number Fig. 1 1) and 40 for unsupervised learning rate (ranging from 0.025 to 1) -were run and the pair giving the best fit was picked. The model was tuned to fit both each individual data set and the average of the data (Fig. 1) . Statistical analysis of these two parameters indicates that: (1) The best vigilance parameter for the fit to mean data was identical to the best vigilance parameter for 50% of the 30 experiments; (2) The best unsupervised learning rate for the fit to mean data was identical to the best unsupervised learning rate for 67% of the 30 experiments.
B. Prototypes or Exemplars
For each category, we analyzed the distribution of the number of hyper-boxes that were created by learning and the distribution of their sizes. The size of a hyper-box measures how general, or prototype-like, the category is. The number of hyper-boxes measures how distributed the category representation is. The mean number of boxes created for each class over the entire set of simulation runs was 2.2 and 2.1 for Class A and Class B, respectively. This result indicates that there was not a single category center for each region, thus eliminating the possibility of a pure prototype-based representation. On the other hand, this number of hyper-boxes is too small to support a claim for a pure exemplar representation. Instead, the network learns larger hyper-boxes that span most of the category space, but in addition learns 1 If ART captures the dynamics of the categorization decision process, it should be able to reproduce these observations. One way to extract this information from the system parameters relies on the fact that the stimuli in the 5-4 category structure are linearly separable. Consequently, the boxes created by the system should not have substantial overlapping regions. This, in turn, implies that almost all of the weights created in the 200 runs and labeled either Class A or Class B should be linearly separable by a hyper-plane that divides the categories. Then, finding the hyper-plane that optimally separates all weights should give a good estimate of the category boundary. The angle at which this hyper-plane intersects each of the axes (dimensions) of the feature space is a direct measure of the predictive power of the corresponding dimension. The closer this angle is to 900 (or to 270 0), the more predictive this dimension is; and conversely, the closer this angle is to 00 (or to 1800) the less predictive it is. The plane could be parameterized in such a way that a bigger parameter for one dimension causes a steeper intersection angle with that dimension; namely, 0 =ao +a1x1 +a2x2 +a3x3 +a4x4, (1) where Xj is a vector with the values of all weights created in the 200 runs along the jth dimension and aj are the parameters of the plane. The first parameter, a., the bias tern, does not effect the inclination of the plane but just its distance from the origin. It is therefore not important for our analysis and will be ignored. Moreover, only the amplitude of the parameters aj matters, not their sign. We find that [a,, The classical prototype and the exemplar models are based on conflicting assumptions about the nature of category representation in humans, yet they both can provide statistical fits of category data. In order to better characterize the dynamics of category learning and information processing, this article adopted a substantially different approach. Instead of trying to come up with an analytical expression that would map successfully the sixteen four-dimensional input data to observations obtained from 5-4 human categorization experiments, we developed an ART model to carry out the incremental learning and decision making process of each individual used in the experiments and then showed how this model could reproduce the experimental results.
Previous studies have shown that ART-based models can fit other data about brain categorization [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . In particular, ART posits that both bottom-up and top-down processes contribute to category learning, shows how a subject can learn which critical feature combinations to attend and which features to ignore, and how sufficiently large mismatches between bottom-up data and learned topdown expectations can drive a memory search for a new or better-fitting category. ART also predicts that matched bottom-up and top-down processes can lead to a resonance that can enable fast learning and also give rise to a conscious brain state. ART learning enables the autonomous creation of new categories and the refinement of previously learned critical feature patterns in response to new exemplars. A dynamically controlled vigilance process helps to determine how general a category will become based on its ability to predict the correct classification. Experimental evidence consistent with predicted properties of vigilance control have been reported in macaque inferotemporal cortex during a categorization task [26] .
An ART model has also been used to explain data about the type of abnormal learning and memory that occur during medial temporal amnesia [33, 34] . A lesion of the ART orienting system, which is interpreted to model aspects of hippocampal dynamics, eliminates vigilance control; that is, the lesioned model behaves as if it has a very low vigilance.
Knowlton and Squire [36] reported dissociations between categorization and recognition in amnesic individuals and used these data to argue for multiple memory systems to mediate these tasks. However, Nosofsky and Zaki [37] and Zaki et al. [38] have shown that they can quantitatively fit the Knowlton and Squire and their own data using an exemplar model in which they choose a low value of their sensitivity parameter. Their low sensitivity parameter plays a role like the low vigilance parameter in ART. It Good fits to data with the 5-4 category structure were achieved by an ART model with the following selfsupervision refinement: Each test exemplar can perturb those memories that had already been learned in the training phase. This memory change represents a kind of selfsupervised learning. It clarifies why in the testing phase less than 100% classification is observed for exemplars that subjects had previously been trained to perfect performance. This learning scheme fits the data and provides new insights into the prototype-exemplar debate. The simulation results suggest that, for this data structure, subject learning leads to what Nosofsky calls a rule-plus-exceptions approach for categorization: the model created, on average, 2 prototypes per category (as opposed to 1, if it were a purely prototypebased classification) of which one covered a large region of the feature space and the other covered a very small region. These results also clarify why small populations of cells in inferotemporal cortex can be used to categorize many objects in the world. Finally, The ART concept of a vigilance-controlled, attentive, critical feature pattern allows this model to overcome problems of classical prototype and exemplar models while explicating in a real-time neural processing framework the intuitive concepts that made these models so appealing.
